Comprehensive architecture documentation covering: - docs/architecture/README.md: Full C4 model diagrams (system context, container, component), data flow sequences, security architecture, AI provider class diagram, CI/CD pipeline, and deployment diagrams. All diagrams use Mermaid for version-controlled diagram-as-code. - docs/architecture/adrs/ADR-001: Tauri vs Electron decision rationale - docs/architecture/adrs/ADR-002: SQLCipher encryption choices and cipher_page_size=16384 rationale for Apple Silicon - docs/architecture/adrs/ADR-003: Provider trait + factory pattern - docs/architecture/adrs/ADR-004: Regex + Aho-Corasick PII detection - docs/architecture/adrs/ADR-005: Auto-generate encryption keys at runtime (documents the fix from PR #24) - docs/architecture/adrs/ADR-006: Zustand state management rationale - docs/wiki/Architecture.md: Updated module table (14 migrations, not 10), corrected integrations description, updated startup sequence to reflect key auto-generation, added links to new ADR docs. - README.md: Fixed stale database paths (tftsr → trcaa) and updated env var descriptions to reflect auto-generation behavior. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
4.0 KiB
ADR-005: Auto-generate Encryption Keys at Runtime
Status: Accepted Date: 2026-04 Deciders: sarman
Context
The application uses two encryption keys:
- Database key (
TFTSR_DB_KEY): SQLCipher AES-256 key for the full database - Credential key (
TFTSR_ENCRYPTION_KEY): AES-256-GCM key for token/API key encryption
The original design required both to be set as environment variables in release builds. This caused:
- Critical failure on Mac: Fresh installs would crash at startup with "file is not a database" error
- Silent failure on save: Saving AI providers would fail with "TFTSR_ENCRYPTION_KEY must be set in release builds"
- Developer friction: Switching from
cargo tauri dev(debug, plain SQLite) to a release build would crash because the existing plain database couldn't be opened as encrypted
Decision
Auto-generate cryptographically secure 256-bit keys at first launch and persist them to the app data directory with restricted file permissions.
Key Storage
| Key | File | Permissions | Location |
|---|---|---|---|
| Database | .dbkey |
0600 (owner r/w only) |
$TFTSR_DATA_DIR/ |
| Credentials | .enckey |
0600 (owner r/w only) |
$TFTSR_DATA_DIR/ |
Platform data directories:
- macOS:
~/Library/Application Support/trcaa/ - Linux:
~/.local/share/trcaa/ - Windows:
%APPDATA%\trcaa\
Key Resolution Order
For both keys:
- Check environment variable (
TFTSR_DB_KEY/TFTSR_ENCRYPTION_KEY) — use if set and non-empty - If debug build — use hardcoded dev key (never touches filesystem)
- If
.dbkey/.enckeyexists and is non-empty — load from file - Otherwise — generate 32 random bytes via
OsRng, hex-encode to 64-char string, write to file withmode 0600
Plain-to-Encrypted Migration
When a release build encounters an existing plain SQLite database (written by a debug build), rather than crashing:
1. Detect plain SQLite via 16-byte header check ("SQLite format 3\0")
2. Copy database to .db.plain-backup
3. Open plain database
4. ATTACH encrypted database at temp path with new key
5. SELECT sqlcipher_export('encrypted') -- copies all tables, indexes, triggers
6. DETACH encrypted
7. rename(temp_encrypted, original_path)
8. Open encrypted database with key
Alternatives Considered
| Option | Pros | Cons |
|---|---|---|
| Auto-generate keys (chosen) | Works out-of-the-box, no user config | Key file loss = data loss (acceptable: key + DB on same machine) |
| Require env vars (original) | Explicit — users know their key | Crashes on fresh install, poor UX |
| Derive from machine ID | No file to lose | Machine ID changes break DB on hardware changes |
| OS keychain | Most secure | Complex cross-platform implementation; adds dependency |
| Prompt user for password | User controls key | Poor UX for a tool; password complexity issues |
Why not OS keychain:
The tauri-plugin-stronghold already provides a keychain-like abstraction for credentials, but integrating SQLCipher key retrieval into Stronghold would create a chicken-and-egg problem: Stronghold itself needs to be initialized before the database that stores Stronghold's key material.
Consequences
Positive:
- Zero-configuration installation — app works on first launch
- Developers can freely switch between debug and release builds
- Environment variable override still available for automated/enterprise deployments
- Key files are protected by Unix file permissions (
0600)
Negative:
- If
.dbkeyor.enckeyare deleted, the database and all stored credentials become permanently inaccessible - Key files are not themselves encrypted — OS-level protection depends on filesystem permissions
- Not suitable for multi-user scenarios where different users need isolated key material (single-user desktop app — acceptable)
Mitigation for key loss:
Document clearly that backing up $TFTSR_DATA_DIR (including hidden files) preserves both key files and database. Loss of keys without losing the database = data loss.