Remove high-risk defaults and tighten data handling across auth, storage, IPC, provider calls, and capabilities so sensitive data is better protected by default. Also update README/wiki security guidance and add targeted tests for the new hardening behaviors. Made-with: Cursor
115 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
115 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# PII Detection
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## Overview
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Before any text is sent to an AI provider, TFTSR scans it for personally identifiable information (PII). Users must review and approve each detected span before the redacted text is transmitted.
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## Detection Flow
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```
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1. Upload log file
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↓
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2. detect_pii(log_file_id)
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→ Scans content with PII regex patterns (including hostname + expanded card brands)
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→ Resolves overlapping matches (longest wins)
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→ Returns Vec<PiiSpan> with byte offsets + replacements
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↓
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3. User reviews spans in PiiDiffViewer (before/after diff)
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→ Approves or rejects each span
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↓
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4. apply_redactions(log_file_id, approved_span_ids)
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→ Rewrites text with replacements (iterates spans in REVERSE order to preserve offsets)
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→ Records SHA-256 hash of redacted text in audit_log
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↓
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5. Redacted text safe to send to AI
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```
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## Detection Patterns
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| Type | Replacement | Pattern notes |
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|------|-------------|---------------|
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| `UrlWithCredentials` | `[URL]` | `scheme://user:pass@host` |
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| `BearerToken` | `[Bearer]` | Case-insensitive `bearer` keyword + token chars |
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| `ApiKey` | `[ApiKey]` | `api_key=`, `apikey=`, `access_token=` + 16+ char value |
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| `Password` | `[Password]` | `password=`, `passwd=`, `pwd=` + non-whitespace value |
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| `Ssn` | `[SSN]` | `\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b` |
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| `CreditCard` | `[CreditCard]` | Visa/MC/Amex/Discover/JCB/Diners patterns |
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| `Email` | `[Email]` | RFC-compliant email addresses |
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| `MacAddress` | `[MAC]` | `XX:XX:XX:XX:XX:XX` and `XX-XX-XX-XX-XX-XX` |
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| `Ipv6` | `[IPv6]` | Full and compressed IPv6 addresses |
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| `Ipv4` | `[IPv4]` | Standard dotted-quad notation |
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| `PhoneNumber` | `[Phone]` | US and international phone formats |
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| `Hostname` | `[Hostname]` | FQDN/hostname detection for internal names |
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| `UrlCredentials` | _(covered by UrlWithCredentials)_ | |
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## Overlap Resolution
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When two patterns match overlapping text, the **longer match wins**:
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```rust
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let mut filtered: Vec<PiiSpan> = Vec::new();
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for span in sorted_by_start {
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if let Some(last) = filtered.last() {
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if span.start < last.end {
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// Overlap: keep the longer span
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if span.end - span.start > last.end - last.start {
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filtered.pop();
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filtered.push(span);
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}
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continue;
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}
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}
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filtered.push(span);
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}
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```
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## PiiSpan Struct
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```rust
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pub struct PiiSpan {
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pub id: String, // UUID v7
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pub pii_type: PiiType,
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pub start: usize, // byte offset in original text
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pub end: usize,
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pub original: String,
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pub replacement: String, // e.g., "[IPv4]"
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}
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```
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## Redaction Algorithm
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Spans are applied in **reverse order** to preserve byte offsets:
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```rust
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let mut redacted = original.to_string();
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for span in approved_spans.iter().rev() { // reverse!
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redacted.replace_range(span.start..span.end, &span.replacement);
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}
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```
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## Audit Logging
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Every redaction and every AI send is logged:
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```rust
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write_audit_event(
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&conn,
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"ai_send", // action
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"issue", // entity_type
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&issue_id, // entity_id
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&json!({
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"log_file_ids": [...],
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"redacted_hash": sha256_hex, // SHA-256 of redacted text
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"provider": provider_name,
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}).to_string(),
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)?;
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```
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## Security Guarantees
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- PII detection runs **locally** — original text never leaves the machine
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- Only the redacted text is sent to AI providers
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- The SHA-256 hash in the audit log allows integrity verification
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- If redaction is skipped (no PII detected), the audit log still records the send
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- Stored `pii_spans.original_value` metadata is cleared after redaction is finalized
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