fix(mcp): improve UX clarity for encrypted env vars during edit
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Add clearer placeholder and helper text to explain that encrypted environment variables are never displayed for security reasons. When editing an existing server, the encrypted_env field shows a placeholder explaining that leaving it blank will preserve existing values. Also apply cargo fmt formatting fixes to store.rs.
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12
.mcp.json
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12
.mcp.json
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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
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{
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"mcpServers": {
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"github": {
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"transport": "stdio",
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"command": "npx",
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"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
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"env": {
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"GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN": "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"
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}
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}
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}
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}
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1834
2026-hackathon_AgenticFeature.md
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1834
2026-hackathon_AgenticFeature.md
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File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@ -57,6 +57,9 @@ cargo clippy --manifest-path src-tauri/Cargo.toml -- -D warnings
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# Rust quick type check (no linking)
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cargo check --manifest-path src-tauri/Cargo.toml
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# Frontend linting
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npx eslint . --max-warnings 0
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```
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### System Prerequisites (Linux/Fedora)
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@ -116,6 +119,8 @@ All command handlers receive `State<'_, AppState>` as a Tauri-injected parameter
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**Database encryption**: `cfg!(debug_assertions)` → plain SQLite; release → SQLCipher AES-256. Key from `TFTSR_DB_KEY` env var (defaults to a dev placeholder). DB path from `TFTSR_DATA_DIR` or platform data dir.
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**Credential encryption**: API keys stored in `AppSettings` are encrypted using AES-256-GCM via the `aes-gcm` crate. The encryption key is derived from `TFTSR_ENCRYPTION_KEY` env var. Credentials are encrypted on save and decrypted on load. See `commands/system.rs::save_settings()` for implementation.
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### Frontend (React / TypeScript)
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**IPC layer**: All Tauri `invoke()` calls are in `src/lib/tauriCommands.ts`. Every command has a typed wrapper function (e.g., `createIssueCmd`, `chatMessageCmd`). This is the single source of truth for the frontend's API surface.
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@ -342,7 +342,8 @@ pub fn get_server_env_config(
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match encrypted {
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Some(enc) => {
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let decrypted = decrypt_token(&enc)?;
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let parsed: std::collections::HashMap<String, String> = serde_json::from_str(&decrypted)
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let parsed: std::collections::HashMap<String, String> =
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serde_json::from_str(&decrypted)
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to parse env_config JSON: {e}"))?;
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Ok(Some(parsed))
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}
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@ -551,8 +552,7 @@ mod tests {
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.unwrap();
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let raw = raw.unwrap();
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assert_ne!(
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raw,
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r#"{"API_KEY":"secret123","DEBUG":"1"}"#,
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raw, r#"{"API_KEY":"secret123","DEBUG":"1"}"#,
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"env_config should be encrypted at rest"
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);
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49
src/lib/INCIDENT_RESPONSE_FRAMEWORK.ts
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49
src/lib/INCIDENT_RESPONSE_FRAMEWORK.ts
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export const INCIDENT_RESPONSE_FRAMEWORK = `
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---
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## INCIDENT RESPONSE METHODOLOGY
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Follow this structured framework for every triage conversation. Each phase must be completed with evidence before advancing.
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### Phase 1: Detection & Evidence Gathering
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- **Do NOT propose fixes** until the problem is fully understood
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- Gather: error messages, timestamps, affected systems, scope of impact, recent changes
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- Ask: "What changed? When did it start? Who/what is affected? What has been tried?"
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- Record all evidence with UTC timestamps
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- Establish a clear problem statement before proceeding
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### Phase 2: Diagnosis & Hypothesis Testing
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- Apply the scientific method: form hypotheses, test them with evidence
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- **The 3-Fix Rule**: If you cannot confidently identify the root cause after 3 hypotheses, STOP and reassess your assumptions — you may be looking at the wrong system or the wrong layer
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- Check the most common causes first (Occam's Razor): DNS, certificates, disk space, permissions, recent deployments
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- Differentiate between symptoms and causes — treat causes, not symptoms
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- Use binary search to narrow scope: which component, which layer, which change
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### Phase 3: Root Cause Analysis with 5-Whys
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- Each "Why" must be backed by evidence, not speculation
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- If you cannot provide evidence for a "Why", state what investigation is needed to confirm
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- Look for systemic issues, not just proximate causes
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- The root cause should explain ALL observed symptoms, not just some
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- Common root cause categories: configuration drift, capacity exhaustion, dependency failure, race condition, human error in process
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### Phase 4: Resolution & Prevention
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- **Immediate fix**: What stops the bleeding right now? (rollback, restart, failover)
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- **Permanent fix**: What prevents recurrence? (code fix, config change, automation)
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- **Runbook update**: Document the fix for future oncall engineers
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- Verify the fix resolves ALL symptoms, not just the primary one
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- Monitor for regression after applying the fix
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### Phase 5: Post-Incident Review
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- Calculate incident metrics: MTTD (detect), MTTA (acknowledge), MTTR (resolve)
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- Conduct blameless post-mortem focused on systems and processes
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- Identify action items with owners and due dates
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- Categories: monitoring gaps, process improvements, technical debt, training needs
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- Ask: "What would have prevented this? What would have detected it faster? What would have resolved it faster?"
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### Communication Practices
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- State your current phase explicitly (e.g., "We are in Phase 2: Diagnosis")
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- Summarize findings at each phase transition
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- Flag assumptions clearly: "ASSUMPTION: ..." vs "CONFIRMED: ..."
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- When advancing the Why level, explicitly state the evidence chain
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`;
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@ -578,11 +578,11 @@ export default function MCPServers() {
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type="password"
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value={form.encrypted_env}
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onChange={(e) => setForm({ ...form, encrypted_env: e.target.value })}
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placeholder="API_KEY=secret TOKEN=xyz"
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placeholder={editServer ? "Leave blank to keep existing values" : "API_KEY=secret TOKEN=xyz"}
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/>
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{editServer && (
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<p className="text-xs text-yellow-600 dark:text-yellow-400 mt-1">
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Leave blank to keep existing encrypted values
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Encrypted values are stored securely and never displayed. Leave blank to preserve existing values.
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</p>
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)}
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</div>
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